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TAX AVERSION,  OPTIMAL TAX RATES,  AND INDEXATION 
ABSTRACT 
Taking account of the costs of tax evasion and avoidance activity 
together with the governments  costs  of tax enforcement it is 
shown that the optimal point on a stylized Laffer curve is located 
on the positively sloped region,  not  at the maximum point of the, 
curve.  The analysis eschews the usual supply—side—type rationale 
for  the Laffer curve and shows that such a curve can arise solely 
as a consequence  of the optimizing tax aversion activity of a 
utility maximizing economic agent.  The analysis further implies 
that  indexation  to inflation may  be warranted by considerations  of 
economic efficiency. 
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Chapel  Hill, NC  27514 Tax evasion,  the illegal underreporting  of income,  is now 
recognized to be significant and  growing in a number of 
industrialized  economies.'  It encompasses understatement  and 
deception about income producing activities that  are reported on 
tax returns, as well as the non—reporting of income producing 
activities in the so—called "underground  economy."  Tax avoidance, 
the  legal  use of tax loopholes, has long been a common practice 
afforded by a myriad of tax laws.  Both tax avoidance and  tax 
evasion activity,  which we lump together  under the term tax 
aversion,  occasion real  resource costs.  An accounting of the 
costs to society of running a tax system should include the cost 
of tax aversion activity as well as the governmentts cost of tax 
enforcement.  Recognizing both kinds of costs,  one of the main 
purposes of  this paper is to present an analysis that indicates 
that  the optimal point on a stylized Laffer curve occurs on the 
positively sloped region—-not at the maximum point of the  curve. 
Wiile concern  regarding the possibility of being on the negatively 
sloped region of a Laffer curve is not misplaced, our analysis 
suggests that such concern should properly extend to the 
positively sloped region above the optimal point as well.  Given 
this result, our analysis suggests that  indexation to inflation of 
a marginally progressive income tax structure may  be warranted by 
considerations  of economic efficiency. 
Our analysis eschews the usual supply—side-type rationale for 
the Laffer curve which is variously based on the incentive effects 
of tax rates on total  output and tax  revenue,  typically by way of 
the labor—leisure  and/or saving and investment—capital 2 
accumulation decisions.2  Rather we show that a Laffer curve can 
arise solely as a consequence  of the optimizing tax aversion 
behavior of a utility maximizing economic agent.  That is, 
changing tax rates yield a Laffer curve eyen when the economic 
agent's total  income from all activities is assumed constant, or 
in other words, even when the usual tax effects on the labor— 
leisure decision are ignored.  At the appropriate  point we will 
indicate  why recognition  of the usual effects does not modify our 
conclusions in any substantive  way. 
In section I we show how  the relationship  between the 
statutory tax rate and optimizing tax aversion behavior gives rise 
to an expected tax rate.  Section II examines the determination of 
the optimal level of tax enforcement and the optimal tax rate,  and 
considers the nature of the deadweight losses that  can arise when 
the statutory tax rate is set  too high.  Section III shows how  a 
marginally progressive income tax structure and inflation can 
generate such losses.  Section IV concludes  with a comparison of 
the relative merits of two alternative strategies for avoiding 
these losses:  periodic discretionary tax cuts,  and income tax 
indexation.  Section V summarizes and concludes the paper. 
I.  Tax Aversion Behavior and the Expected Tax Rate 
The ensuing analysis focuses on the utility maximizing 
representative  economic agent who engages in tax aversion, which 
encompasses both tax avoidance and evasion behavior  Tax aversion 
has associated costs such as,  for instance, the use of the agent's 3 
own time to investigate and carry out aversion activities, and/or 
the hiring of expert advice and assistance provided by accountants 
and tax attorneys.  The extent to which the optimizing  economic 
agent finds it worthwhile to engage in tax aversion is assumed to 
depend on the relationship  between the statutory tax rate,  the 
costs of tax aversio., the probability that  tax evasion will be 
detected (not avoidance  which is legal),  and the  fine  if 
detected. 
l.a  The Effect of Tax Rates on Tax Aversion 
The literature  on the theoretical  analysis of tax evasion 
within an expected utility framework is fairly extensive; that on 
tax avoidance is less  A  case  can  be  made  that  the two 
activities should be analyzed jointly.  Cross and Shaw (1982)  have 
argued that a joint analysis is called for because  of the 
possibilities of substitutability  and complementarity.  For 
instance, any reduction in the probability of detection of  tax 
evasion or in the penalty for evasion  will raise the rate of 
return on evasion relative to that  on avoidance activity. 
Similarly, any increase in the availability of avoidance loopholes 
will likely increase avoidance relative to evasion activity. 
Furthermore, Cross and Shaw point out that because certain evasion 
(avoidance)  activities can affect the marginal cost of avoidance 
(evasion)  activities,  the costs of engaging in evasion  and 
avoidance should be modeled as interdependent. For instance, an 
accountant or attorney paid to advise on tax avoidance might provide information  on tax evasion possibilities,  unwittingly or 
otherwise. 
In Cross and Shaw's analysis of tax aversion expected utility 
depends on both tax avoidance and tax evasion activities with 
their interdependent  costs to the taxpayer represented by a joint 
cost  function.  Assume that  income Y is the agent's total income 
from all  activities,  earned in both the underground and  above 
ground economy,  in both legal  and illegal activities.  Given a 
proportional income tax rate t, assuming declining absolute risk 
aversion, and that total  income Y is exogenous, expected utility 
is 
(1)  E(U)  (l-p)U(V)  + pU(X) 
where the net income of the taxpayer if evasion is not detected is 
(2)  V  Y(1—r) + (91Y 
+  — C(e1Y,  e2Y) 
while if evasion is detected it is 
(3)  X = Y(1—t)  + 
re1y + te2Y(i—F) 
— 
C(e11,  e2Y) 
where 0 < p. t, e1,  82 
< 1;  F > 1; C1,  C2,  C11,  C22 
> 0 and C12 
( 
0; where p is the probability  of detection, e  and °2 are the 
portions of income avoiding and evading tax respectively,5 F is 
the fine imposed if evasion I. detected, and the joint  cost 5 
function C(.,.) specifies complementarity between avoidance and 
evasion activity——c12 
< 0.6  Within this framework it can be shown 
(see  Cross and Shaw (1982)  for details) that 
(4)  —  —  <0 
(5)  ,  <  0 
(6)  —  _.a  < 
Interestingly enough,  the effects of a tax rate change on tax 
avoidance and tax evasion activity cannot be signed unambiguously. 
However it can be shown (see Cross and  Shaw,  p.  41)  that  if  > 0 
e1  then  > 0  because in that  case an increase (decrease)  in the 
tax rate t increases  (reduces)  tax evasion activity which in turn 
lowers (raises)  the marginal cost  of tax avoidance  and causes an 
increase (reduction)  in avoidance  activity.  This result is of 
interest in view of some recent empirical findings by Clotfelter 
(1983) and Slemrod (l985).  Using over 47,000 individual U.S.  tax 
returns for  1969  ciotfelter estimates the elasticity of tax 
evasion with respect to marginal tax rates to be significantly 
positive.  Using over 23,000  U.S.  tax returns for  1977 Slemrod has 
difficulty separating income from tax rate effects and concludes 
(p.  238)  simply that  the tendency for  tax evasion increases for 
higher income,  higher tax rate households."  Hence in the analysis 6 
382 
to follow it will be assumed that — 
>  0, and given that 
382  30 
> 0 implies —i  >  0 in the theoretical framework  described 
-C 
381  above,  it will also be assumed that  > 0 in the ensuing 
analysis. 
I.b  The  Tax Rate—Expected Tax Rate Relationship 
The fraction of  income that escapes taxation due to tax 
aversion activity equals 01 + 
82.  Hence •  1  — 
81 
— 
82  is the 
fraction  of income not subject to tax aversion.  The expected tax 
revenue from the representative  economic agent is given by 
+  rYp[  + 
82F] 
= roY 
where 8  [(1 — 
81 
— °2  + 
pe2F)  is obviously a function of t, F, 
and  p, noting that  81 and 82 are functions  of  r, F,  and p as 
described above.  Hence the  tax aversion behavior of  the 
representative  economic agent is defined by a tax aversion 
function e(t,  F, p), such that  < .  es.,  e 
> 0, given that 
381  382  381  382  30i  °2  —,  —, — 
<  0, and assuming that -—-  --— 
>  0, 
and that  (pF — 1)  < 0:  e(-r,  F, p) is a decreasing function of 
r such that 0 <  e(-r,  F, p) < i.8 
The product of the statutory tax rate r and the tax aversion 
function  defines the expected tax rate 
(7)  7  re(-r, F, p). 7 
It  is the  fraction of income9 the government expects to collect in 
tax revenue from the economic agent engaged in the optimal amount 
of tax aversion for given levels of the statutory tax rate r,  the 
fine F imposed if tax evasion is detected, and the probability p 
of detection.  In general, for  any tax aversion function Ott,  F, p) 
there  is some level  of the statutory tax rate r which yields a 
maximum expected tax rate,  given the values of F  and p.  At that 
value of  r 
(8)  (ott,  F, p) +  0 
while  at any  lower value  (e(r, F, p) + re)  >  0,  and at any higher 
value (oCt. F,  p)  + te') 
< o.10  For example, for given levels of 
F and p the relationship between r  and re(r,  F, p) is represented 
by a curve such as Oml  in Figure 1.  The maximum expected tax rate 
tmO(t F, p) occurs at the statutory tax rate  where (8)  holds. 
The tax rate—expected tax rate relationship Oml may be termed the 
Laffer curve for the economic agent,  given F and p. 
II.  The Optimal Level  of Tax  Enforcement and the Opmal Tax Rate 
The shape and position of the Laffer curve in Figure 1 and 
hence the specific value of  r  which gives the maximum expected tax 
rate  is a function of the government's  tax enforcement variables—— 
the fine F and  the probability  of detection p of tax evasion.  An 
increase in F and/or p shifts the curve upward, such as from Oml 

























(9)  lie  tOe>  0 
(10)  = te 
> 
The optimal  setting o  the  tax enforcement  variables  F and p as 
well  as the optimal setting  of the statutory  tax rate t depends  on 
the government's  desired expected  tax rate,  since it is the 
expected  tax  rate that determines the amount  of tax  revenue  the 
government  expects to collect  from the  representative  economic 
agent. 
II.a  Optimal  r, F, and p Given the Desired Expected  Tax Rate 
Here we make  the following  assumption:  the government  first 
decides  on the  level of its total  spending on all activities, 
aside  from tax enforcement  expenditure,  and then  determines  the 
level of the expected  tax rate desired  to finance such spending.11 
The process  and objectives  which determine  the government's  total 
spending  are,  like the  level of its desired expected tax rate, 
simply  taken as given for the purposes  of this analysis. 
Given  the objective  of establishing  the desired  expected tax 
rate, what  is the optimal  level of government  spending  on tax 
enforcement  activity,  per  the representative  economic  agent,  and 
the optimal  setting  of the statutory  tax rate?  From socieyj 
perspective,  it is that setting  of F, p, and t which minimizes  the 
total of the government's  tax enforcement  cost per representative 9 
economic  agent jj  the cost of tax aversion  activity incurred by 
the representative  economic agent  (the C(.,.)  function  in 
equations  (2)  and  (3)),  since the  latter  cost,  like the  former, 
uses up resources  otherwise  available  to society.  The 
government's  enforcement  cost  per representative  economic  agent 
may be represented  by the  function  g(F,  p)  where  g, 
> 0,  reflecting  the assumptions  that  such costs  rises at an 
increasing  rate with F,  the fine imposed  on tax evaders,  and p. 
the probability  that an evader  will be detected.  Larger  fines are 
likely to involve the government  in more litigation  and lengthier 
court  contestations,  while raising  the probability  of detection 
requires  the  employment  of more tax agents and an increase  in the 
frequency  and/or intensity  of tax audits.  The  representative 
economic  agent's  tax aversion  cost function  C(.,.)  can be written, 
using the results (4),  (5), and  (6), as 
C(r,  F, p) — C[e1,(r,  F, p),  e2(t, F, p)] 
where 










< 0. 10 
The  setting  of t, F,  and p  which minimizes  the sum of tax 
enforcement  plus  tax aversion costs per representative  economic 
agent,  subject  to achieving  a desired  expected  tax  rate,  is 
obtained  from the Lagrange function 
(11) L  g(V,  p)  + C(t,  F, p)  + X(K—te(t,  F,  p)) 
where X is the Lagrange  multiplier,  K is the given  desired level 
of the expected  tax rate,  and all other variables  are as defined 
before.12  Different.iating (11) with respect  to t,  7,  and p,  the 
first order  conditions  are 
(12) L7 
—  + C 
— XtO 
=  0 
(13) L  g 
+ C 
—  —  0 
(14) L 
— C 
— X  (OCr, F, p) + re1)  0 
(15) L 
— K  — te(t,  F,  p) = 0 
From  (12).  (13), and  (14)  we have that 
C  C TO 
(16)  (e(t, F,  P)  + te'] 
— 
g+C7  g+C 
< 0 
given that g7, g, e7,  er,,  C1 
> 0  and  C7, C 
< 0. 11 
The interpretation  of  (16)  is facilitated  by Figure 2 where 
the horizontal  line at K represents  the desired  level of the 
expected  tax  rate.  It intersects  the  economic  agent's  Laffer 
curve at points  a and b.  The  slope of the Laffer  curve,  given by 
the  left side  of (16)  (see (8)), is positive at point a and 
corresponds  to a cost  (tax enforcement  plus tax aversion cost) 
minimizing  position  when }g,} > 
JCF} and jg} 
>  in (16).  At 
point  b the slope of the Laffer  curve  is negative  and  corresponds 
to a situation  where  < ICF} and (g} 
< jC. 
Point  b cannot 
be a mininun cost position  however.  For consider  what happens to 
costs  (g(F,p) + C(t, F, p) in (11)) given F and p, which determine 
the position of the  Laffer curve,  if at point  b the statutory  tax 
rate  t is reduced  below tb  The only cost affected is the cost  of 
tax aversion  C(r,  F,  p)  because  t doesn't  appear  in g(F,  p). 
Since  > 0 the cost of tax aversion ie reduced  when  r  is 
lowered,  and  the same expected  tax rate K can be realized  at a 
lower statutory  tax rate ta corresponding  to point a on the 
positively  sloped portion  of the Laffer  curve. 
It should  be emphasized  that a narrower cost accounting——say 
from the  tax collector's  perspective——would  ignore  the cost  of tax 
aversion  activity to the economic  agent  represented  by the C(w,  F, p) 
function.  Given this narrower  perspective,  C(t, F,  p)  is dropped 
from (11), and it must be true from (14) that the  optimal  setting 
of r occurs  where the slope  of the Laffer  curve,  given by [e(r, F, 
p) + t9]. equals  zero.  In that case the optiaal r  corresponds  to 


















would be tangent  to the K line  representing  the desired  expected 
tax rate,  the position  of the curve of course deternined  by the 
optimal  setting  of F and p.  By contrast,  for a complete  cost 
accounting from society's  perspective  it is necessary  to take 
account  of both th3overnment  's cost of enforci_the tax code on 
the representative  economic  a2pnt,  and the cost of the a2ent's tax 
aversion activity;  then the optimal  settingef  the statutory  tax 
rate will  correjQgndto a point  on the positively-s loped region  of 
the representative  economic  ggent's_Laffer  curve. 
Note that these results  derive solely from tax aversion 
behavior since our analysis  has completely  ignored  the tax effects 
on the labor—leisure  decision  and hence on Y, which has  been 
assumed  constant.  However  our  conclusions  are  not affected in any 
substantive  way when  we allow y to be affected  by t,  F, and p.13 
II.b  The Maximum  Optimal  Expected  Tax Rate 
We have  examined  the optimal  setting of  r, F, and p given  a 
desired level of the expected tax rate.  But what  is the maximum 
expected tax rate  that can be achieved  optimally?  Does  the 
maximum  expected tax rate  that can be achieved  optimally lie along 
the positively  sloped region  of the representative  economic 
agent's  Laffer  curve,  or does it occur at the maximum  point? 
To answer  this question  we need to determine  the maximum 
expected tax rate net of tax enforcement  and  tax aversion  costs 
that can be imposed on the representative  economic agent.  The 
expected tax rate minus enforcement  and aversion costs  is given by 13 
(17) M — re(r,  F, p) — g(F,  p) — C(r,  F,  p) 
where all variables  are as defined before.  Differentiating  (17) 
with respect to F,  p,  and t gives 
-  — 
CF 
















= o(r,  F, p) +  —  C 
= 0 
or 
(20) e(t, F,  p)  + re  C  > 0. 
According  to (18) and (19) the maximws  expected tax rate  that 
can be achieved optimally  occurs  when tax enforcement  effort, 
implemented  by increasing  F and p, has been carried  to the point 
where the expected  marginal tax revenue,  teF and re, equals the 
marginal cost of tax enforcement  plus  the marginal  cost  of tax 
aversion  activity__(g 
+ 
CF) for F and (g 
+ C) 
for p.  Recalling 
that gb., g 
> 0  and CF.  C, 
< 0,  when Jg} 
> JCJ  and )gJ 
> JCJ 
the  level of  r  required for  (18) and  (19) to hold  must satisfy 14 
(20).  But observe in  (20)  that  (s(t, F,  p)  ÷ 
te')  >  0,  since  > 
0, so that the  setting  of t that gives the maximum  expected tax 
rate that  can be achieved  optimally  must lie along  the positivell 
sloped region  of the Laffer  curve,  such as at point  a in Figure 3 
As the curve  indicates,  it is possible to have a higher 
expected tax  rate than  that at point a sImply  by setting the 
statutory  tax rate  higher  than  But  the additional  tax 
aversion cost  (since  >  0)  required to achieve  it would be 
greater than  the additional  expected tax revenue  it would 
generate.  Note that  if tax aversion  costs are  ignored,  so that 
only the narrower cost accounting  of the tax collector's 
perspective  obtains,  then  C(t, F, p) is dropped from  (17)  and the 
apparent "optimal"  setting  of t corresponds  to the maximum point m 
on the Laffer  curve  in Figure  3, since  (e(t, F, p) + tS) then 
equals zero by  (20). 
Finally,  consider  the  case where  <  }C,1  and }g < 
Then the marginal costs of increasing  F and p, the right-hand 
sides of  (18)  and  (19), are negative——government  enforcement  costs 
increase  less  than tax aversion costs decline.  This  suggests that 
the government  step up enforcement  until  the probability  p of 
detectiom  of tax evasion  equals  1,  and/or increase  the  fine F 
until  tax evasion  activity  is completely  discouraged.  If C12  < 0 
(for the cost  function  C(.,')  in  (2)  and  (3))  is sufficiently 
negative tax avoidance  (a legal  activity,  not  an object  of 
detection  or fine) could also be eliminated.  Then the Laffer 
curve would be the 45  line  in Figure 3——the expected  tax rate 0 15 
would equal  the statutory  tax  for all levels of t.  On the other 
hand,  if the jointness  of costs of tax avoidance  and tax evasion 
is weak or non-existent  (012  0) then  the Laffer curve  would lie 
somewhere  between  the  45  line and the  curve passing through  point 
a in Figure  3. 
Generally,  it is not a government's  objective  to establish 
the maximum  optimal  expected tax rate.  Rather  government 
expenditure  levels determined  by other objectives  will dictate the 
need for a given desired  level  of the expected tax  rate and the 
optimal setting  of t, F, and p to satisfy equations (l2)—(l5),  as 
previously  discussed.  However, what if the government  expenditure 
levels dictated by these  other objectives  are  so high  that  the 
given expected tax rate  required  to finance  them exceeds the 
maximum optimal  expected  tax rate?  Then  we have the  ingredients 
for a structural  deficit-—a  situation  where government 
expenditures  outstrip the capacity  to finance  them with tax 
revenue. 
II.c  Overshooting  the Optimal  Tax Rate:  A Deadweight  Loss 
In the ensuing  discussion  we will use the term  "optimal  tax 
rate"  to refer  to that value of the statutory  tax rate given by 
equations (12)—(15),  the equations  which give  the optimal  values 
of t, F, and p for a given desired  level  of the expected  tax  rate. 
For  example,  in Figure 2 suppose  ta is the optimal  value  of 
the statutory  tax rate and that  Fa and a 
are  the optimal  settings 
of F and p for achieving  the given desired expected  tax rate K = 16 
Tae(t, Fa 'a' Oml  is the representative  agents Laffer curve 
determined  by Fa and  and a  point a on Oml  corresponds  to the 
optimal tax  rate ta  Note that  given a  and p5 the desired 
expected tax  rate K also can be achieved  by setting  the statutory 
tax rate  equal  to 
rb corresponding  to point b on Omi, giving 
tbe(tb,  Fa 
= ta8(Ta  F,  a'  However,  Tb is not  optimal 
because it gives  rise  to a deadweight  loss  to society  due  to the 
larger  tax aversion  cost  occasioned  by tb relative  to that which 
occurs at ta since CT  >  0. 
There are many other  possible  Laffer  curves  in Figure 2  (not 
shown)  corresponding  to other  levels of F and p,  and  hence many 
other settings of  r  which  would give the expected  tax  rate K.  But 
none of them are optimal--they  do not satisfy  equations  (12)-(15) 
None—the—less  it is true  that,  just like  the optimal  curve Omi, 
each of these  Laffer  curves has  two points——one  on positively 
sloped region and one along the negative slope——corresponding  to 
the  two levels  of the statutory  tax rate that yield the expected 
tax rate K.  By the same  argument as for  the optimal  curve Gal, 
the  lower level  of t occasions  less resource  exppditure  on tax 
aversion than  the higher  one.  Given the  desired  level of the 
expected tax  rate,  for y  Laffer  curve,  whether  optimal  by 
equations (12)-(15)  or not,  we will  refer to the lower  level  of t 
which yields the desired  expected tax rate as the critical tax 
rate.  Optimal  tax rates are a subset  of critical tax rates.  We 
use such terminology  in order  to recognize  that  there are many 
possible levels  of tax enforcement  that are not optimal  but  yet 17 
admit the  possibility  of attaining  a given desired  level  of the 
expected tax rate;  therefore  there are many possible  Laffer 
curves,  each  with its associated  critical  tax rate. 
In sum, for any given F and p  and desired level of the 
expected tax rate, whenever the statutory  tax rate exceeds the 
critical tax rate society suffers  a deadweight  loss—-nobody  gains 
—-because  by reducing the statutory  tax rate  to the  critical  level 
the economic  agent  is induced to expend  fewer resources  on tax 
aversion activity.  Moreover,  whatever the expected tax rate 
levels attainable  on the Laffer  curve associated  with the given F 
and  p,  such  expected  tax rates can always  be attained  with lower 
tax aversion costs  to society by use  of statutory  tax rates 
corresponding  to the positively,  as opposed to negatively,  sloped 
region  of the curve. 
III. The Critical Tax Rate and Inflation 
Assume now that the  tax structure  is marginally  progressive 
and that tax brackets  are defined  according  to nominal income 
levels.  Also assume that the statutory  tax rate  t is a weighted 
average  of the progressively  higher tax rates associated  with 
successively  higher income brackets,  each bracket's  tax rate 
weighted by the percent  of the representative  economic  agent's 
nominal income  in that bracket.  Given such a tax structure,  as is 
well  known, inflation will  push the  representative  economic  agent 
into  successively  higher tax brackets,  effectively  subjecting  an 
evergrowing  portion  of the agent's  income  to higher  tax  rates. 18 
Because  of this phenomenon,  popularly  known as bracket—creep,  an 
ever—increasing  average income tax rate t is imposed  on the 
agent. 
14 
Such inflation  generated  bracket creep  increases  r  along the 
horizontal  axes in Figures  1-3.  The  upper  limit  on  r of course  is 
the statutory  tax rate prevailing  In the highest income tax 
bracket  of the marginally  progressive  tax structure;  once reached, 
t will cease rising despite  continuing  inflation.  The crucial 
concern,  however  Is the possibilityat  such bracket_crepgn 
push  r  the  critical  tax rate and ultimatejL  onto  the 
negatively  sloped region of the affer curve.  This  likelihood  of 
course depends on the degree of marginal progressivity  of the  tax 
structure  as well as the position  of the prevailing  Laffer  curve. 
IV.  Discretionary  Tax Cuts versus Income Tax Indexation 
One way to keep bracket  creep from driving  t onto the 
negatively  sloped region  of the agent's  Laffer curve is by 
discretionary  reduction  of marginally  progressive  tax  rates 
whenever bracket  creep pushes  r  above the critical tax rate. 
While such cuts could in principle  maintain  r at the critical  or 
even optimal level,  given  an optimal level of tax enforcement 
(i.e., optimal levels of F and p),  in practice inflation-generated 
bracket  creep operates continuously  to push t above either  a 
critical or an optimal  level while discretionary  tax cuts are 
typically  infrequent  and subject  to the pressures  of politics. 
Hence  even if  Is periodically  moved back to a  critical  or an 19 
optimal  level  by discretionary  tax cuts, bracket creep will  assure 
that  r  is almost continuously  above such  levels and that  society 
incurs  the associated  deadweight  loss due to resource expenditure 
on tax aversion  activity. 
As an alternative  to discretionary  tax cuts,  suppose the tax 
brackets  defined  according  to nominal  income  levels  in the 
marginally  progressive  income  tax structure  are linked  to real 
income  levels.  This can be achieved by indexing  the bracket- 
defining  nominal  income levels  to the inflation  rate.  In 
principle  such income tax indexing  would allow establishment  of 
the  optimal  level of tax enforcement  in conjunction  with 
continuous  maintenance  of the optimal  tax rate because it would 
prevent  bracket creep  from driving  t beyond thegtirnal  tax rate. 
In reality,  policymakers  don't  know the optimal level of tax 
enforcement  and hence the optimal  level of  t.  They don't  even 
know the relationship  between  a  desired  expected tax  rate and the 
critical  tax rate  needed to achieve  it when government  tax 
enforcement  expenditures  are not optimal.  Nonetheless,  whatever 
the  level of tax enforcement  it is still  desirable  to avoid 
positions  along the negatively  sloped  region  of the associated 
Laffer  curve.  At a practical  level  then, it can be argued that 
income  tax indexing  will  prevent bracket  creep from pushing  t past 
the peak  of the agent's  Laffer  curve,  or if already past  it, at 
least prevent  further increases  in the deadweight  loss associated 
with movement  down the negatively—sloped  region  of the curve. 20 
V.  Conclusion 
It has been shown that due to tax aversion  behavior there  is 
associated  with any statutory  tax rate a corresponding  lower 
expected tax rate,  defined  as the  fraction  of a dollar  of income 
that  the government  expects to collect in tax revenue.  Because 
tax aversion  behavior  depends on the level  of the statutory tax 
rate  there  is some optimal level  of tax  enforcement  (some optimal 
setting  of F and p) and the statutory  tax rate t for any 
level  of the expected tax rate  desired by the government.  The 
optimal  statutory  tax rate  corresponds  to a point  on the 
positively  sloped region  of the economic  agent's  Laffer  curve. 
Furthermore,  there is an upper limit on the  level of the expected 
tax rate that  the government  can achieve  optimally,  and it too 
corresponds  to a  point on the positively  sloped region  of a  Laffer 
curve. 
Given a desired level of the expected  tax rate  (assumed  less 
than  or equal  to the upper limit)  and the associated  optimal 
setting  of the statutory  tax rate,  society  suffers deadweight 
losses  if the statutory  tax  rate  is set  higher  than the optimal 
level.  Given a marginally  progressive  tax structure,  such 
deadweight  losses  are particularly  likely when there is inflation. 
It may be argued  that such losses  are best avoided  by indexing the 
marginally  progressive  tax structure  to inflation  rather than by 
periodically  cutting  statutory  tax rates. 21 
Finally,  from an efficiency  standpoint,  the proper question 
is not  is the statutory  tax rate  above  the point where the  Laffer 
curve's  slope becomes  negative?  Rather is the statutory  tax rate 
above the  lower  rate corresponding  to the optimum  point on the 
positively  sloped region  of the curve? Footnotes 
1.  See  Simon  and  Witte, Witte,  and the recent U.S. Internal 
Revenue  Service report  on this subject; also  note the 
extensive  citations  to research  in the  area cited by 
these authors.  In these studies,  tax  evasion  refers  to 
income  taxes individuals  and corporations should  pay  but 
do not,  encompassing  income earned  from both legal and 
illegal  activity. 
2.  See,  for instance, Bender (1984), Fullerton  (1982), 
Shailer  (1983), Stuart (1981), and Yuncker  (1986). 
3.  Before  proceeding  one  might well ask  about  the real— 
world  magnitude  of  tax evasion.  The latest IRS report 
estimates  that $90.5 billion  of  federal  income tax  was 
lost in the United  States  in 1981 due  to unreported 
incomes,  an amount  approximately  equal  to  22 percant  of 
total federal  corporate  and  personal  income taxes 
actually  collected  in 1981; $81.5 billion  was  due to 
unreported  legal income and  another $9.0  billion  due to 
unreported  income earned  in illegal activities.  Witte 
summarized  findings in several  countries  and reports 
that in general  the Scandinavian  countries,  West 
Germany,  and the United  Kingdom  have  unrecorded  economic 
activity (therefore untaxable)  comparable  to that of  the 
United  States  where such  activity  amounted  to 
approximately  12 percent  of national  income in 1979; 
such activity was estimated  to equal  20—25 percent  of 
22 GNP in Italy, while for Belgiim  and France  it was 
estimated  to be somewhere  between  the estimates  for the 
U.S. and Italy. 
4.  Analysis  focusing on tax  evasion has  origins  in the 
expected utility  analysis  of Allingham  and Sandso 
(1972): see,  for example,  Srinvasan  (1973), Yitzhaki 
(1974), McCaleb  (1976), Weiss  (1976), Andersen (1977), 
Pencave].  (1979), Christiansen  (1980), Isachsen and Strom 
(1980), Cowell  (1981), Sandmo  (1981), and  Usher  (1986). 
An expected utility  analysis of tax avoidance may be 
found in  Kane and Valentini  (1975) and Kane  (1976). 
5.  Note that the shifting  between  taxed and untaxed 
activities  by the agent  is  in the analysis  by virtue  of 
the choice variables  e1 and 
e2,  the  portions  of  income 
avoiding and evading tax  respectively. 
6.  The amounts  of income avoiding and evading  tax are 
respectively  denoted A  and E by Cross and Shaw  where  in 
terms of our notation A  e1y  and E  e2Y.  We express 
avoidance  and evasion  in terms of  the fractions  and 
e2  in order to expedite  the ensuing  analysis and our use 
of the  concept  of  the expected  tax rate. 
7.  Some experimental  evidence  that there  is a positive 
relationship  between  tax  rates and tax evasion  has been 
provided  by Friedland,  Maital, and  Rutenberg  (1978). 
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8.  Noting  that 
= - -—' +  (pF-1) — 
it follows  that a sufficient  condition  for  < 0  is 
that pF <  1.  If the expected  fine, pF,  for tax 
avoidance  is large enough,  so  that pF > 1,  then there 
will be no tax  aversion.  In that case  e = 1  for  all t. 
The  condition  pF  <  1 also assures  that  > 0. 
9.  Since  the representative  economic  agent's  income Y is a 
constant  exogenous  variable,  Y is dropped  from the 
ensuing  discussing.  Whenever  the  expected  tax rate is 
mentioned  it  is the case that the statement  could be 
taken to refer to the tax revenue expected  to be 
collected  from  the representative  economic agent since 
that revenue  equals  the agent's income  Y multiplied  by 
the expected  tax  rate re(t,  F,  p).  We will consider  the 
implications  of allowing Y to vary  below. 
10.  te(r,  F,  p)  achieves a maximum when e(t, F,  p)  + te = 0 
only if  +  <  0;  a sufficient  condition  for this 
to occur is  that  < 0,  given e 
< 0. 
11.  We don't mean to imply that this is a realistic 
assumption  about  the way the government  actually 
operates.  It may finance  its spending  in part by 
taxation  and in part by bond financing  or money 
creation,  and it may be that its choice  of how  much to 2 
spend is in part dependent  on concern  about  the implied 
size  of the taxation  and  possible deficit  financing 
required. 
12.  It can be argued that the desired  expected  tax  rate K 
should  be a function of F and  p to the extent  that  there 
is  concern  to finance  the government's  tax enforcement 
efforts with tax revenue.  Entering  the  desired  tax  rate 
K(F, p),  Ks,, K9 
> 0  doesn't  affect  the  analysis  in  any 
substantive  way. 
13.  Allowing  for such  effects by explicitly  recognizing  Y in 
the analysis  (recall that its presence has been ignored 
since  it was assumed  given) and interpreting  K in  (11) 
as  the level of  tax revenue I (equals  re(t,  F,  p)Y)  the 
government  desires  to collect  from the  representative 
economic agent,  optimization  (analogous  to  (12)-(15)) 
yields 
(16')  (e(-r,  F,  p)Y + Yte + re(t,  F,  p) 
cT[-reF 




Again  by the sante  argument as was  made for (16)  in 
conjunction  with  Figure  2  to establish  the  minimum  cost 
position,  the left side of  (16'),  which is the slope of th 
Laffer curve,  is positive at point a in Figure  2  and again 
corresponds  to the minimum  cost position,  no matter  what is assumed  about the signs of  ,  ,  or  r  F 
It is also readily  evident  from the analogue  to  (14),  which 
is 
(14')  C 
— X(e(t,  F,  p)  +  + te(r,  F,  p)  = 0 
that  in the case of the narrower  perspective  of  the tax 
collector  where C(r, F,  p)  is ignored, so that C  doesn't 
appear  in  (14'),  the  optimal setting  of  still occurs  where 
the slope of  the Laffer curve  (the bracketed  expression  in 
(14')) equals  zero. 
14.  When Cross and Shaw (1982)  amend the model of equations  (1)- 
(3)  to specify  a marginally  progressive  tax structure  the 
ambiguity  in  (4) remains,  not surprisingly.  We continue  to 
assume that e, e 
> 0 and hence that  > 0. 27 
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